There was a great international scandal when it turned out that the CIA uses European airports for transporting to the US the persons suspected of terrorism. America got accused of infringement on human rights, while the European governments involved lost their face.   

While Europe is examining how the western special services bypass the limits allowed by the law, Russia, China and the Central Asian states are making their own network of giving up the suspected in a quiet way. Significantly, it’s not Russia, but Uzbekistan and China to be initiators in that process.   

Special services got to deal with this problem first long before 11/9. In February 1995 the FBI got information that the organizer of the first explosion in the World Trade Center in 1993, Ramzi Yusef, had been staying in Pakistan. A question arose about his quiet arrest and transporting to the US without much noise. It was decided to “forget” about official procedure of extradition, as it could take too long and could not guarantee the needed outcome. FBI operative officers managed to catch Yusef with the help from the local special services. As for secretly carrying him to the US, Americans had to paint their military aircraft in civilian colors, as in 1995 Islamabad would not allow landing by any US transport plane. Afterwards, Pentagon charged FBI for $12 millions for the painting done. Refueling was done in the air so that exclude any opportunity for Yusef to ask for political asylum during interim stop in any country.         

That time FBI did not have people in Pakistan for making an arrest, and it was done by a couple of Pakistani soldiers and guards from the embassy. After 11 September it became clear that such amateurish methods would not suffice any longer. It took making a system enabling detaining the suspects quickly, without judicial hindrance and noise in the press. As a result of bilateral agreements by the US and some regimes, the joint operative groups were created for making instant arrests, and the secret CIA prisons were set up for temporary keeping in the custody of the persons detained in Egypt, Morocco, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The special Aero Contracts Company with the flying stock of 26 aircraft began to be used by the CIA for transportation of the detained. All that de facto legalized procedure of kidnapping of the suspected got to be called “rendition”.         

It turns out that it’s not only the US to have a need in such a system. Special services of the former Soviet Union and China have been trying several years to build up a similar stuff. The process not being finished yet, it is obvious that the creators of the system follow the American pattern. The system is called Regional Counter-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation (RCTS SOC).   

New order

Besides Russia and China, SOC’s other members are Central Asian states: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. Joint struggle with terrorism, separatism and extremism is considered to be one of the main SOC purposes.

In 2004 RCTS was created especially for the mentioned purposes; actually it was formed for coordinating the actions of mutual giving up the suspects. Its main objective is helping special services of the states-members to bypass the obstacles presented by national legislations and by the norms of the international law about giving up the suspects.   

The procedure of extradition is the biggest obstacle implying decision taking on the level of the Prosecutor General’s offices. First, it is rather long. Second, it is open. Third, the decision of extradition may be appealed in the court. And the main problem is that Russian Prosecutor General’s office often refuses extraditions to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as they not always can submit the evidence of the crime committed, and the count incriminated is not always subject of consideration by the Russian legislation. Besides, as it is considered by the EU, tortures are used in prisons of the states mentioned, and this is why extradition decisions are readily appealed in the European Court for Human Rights, where Russia finds herself to be constantly blamed for violation of the international norms, even without this aspect.   

The topic of struggle against terrorism turned out to be a very convenient pretext for simplification of procedure of detention and giving up people. According to our information, RCTS SOC is engaged in making its own parallel structure that can be used instead of official extradition. Cooperation between the special services and enforcing bodies is done through placement of direct requests of assistance. A request includes the name of an enforcing body, a purpose and justification, and a description of the action required, e.g. detention and passing a person. The request is signed by the head, or his deputy, of the central authorized body, i.e. the local special service. In urgent cases the request may be passed in oral way.    

SOC states have gone very far in forming this new system. For example, the Shanghai convention allows application of the legislation of another country on the Russian territory, made at a request by special services of Uzbekistan or China. This is done for cases where the crime by a person guilty in another country cannot be determined as a crime in accordance with the Russian laws.  

It is very convenient, for example, for the Chinese counter-intelligence service that some advocate for Tibetan independence taking liberty of making free statements in the Internet, to know that he would not find shelter in Kalmykia (a Russian republic) with his brothers in faith, as Russia would have to act in accordance with the Chinese law.  

The refugee status has been another obstacle for a special service wishing to get to their citizen in a neighboring country. That was a salvation for Uzbeks and Tajiks persecuted in their motherland for their religious beliefs or oppositional activities. The agreements signed within the SOC framework speak about non-provision of the shelter to persons involved in terrorist, separatist or extremist activities. That means, anyone who gets listed in the general SOC data bank would not be given a refugee status, despite the fact that extremism and separatism may be interpreted differently in different countries. The interpretation by those chasing after will always be the basis.  

This is already being used in practice. For example, FSB may advise the Migration Service about some person who is considered unreliable because he preached something wrong several years ago in Fergana valley, and such a person will be refused a refugee status, after which he may be deported from Russia as an illegal migrant.

Exactly that way the Uzbek Dilshot Kurbanov, 36, failed to get the refugee status. He moved to Russia in 2002 avoiding the regular summons for examinations related to his membership in an Islamic organization. He was just a common believer, but anyway he decided to get out of harm’s way. Nonetheless, in 2007 he was detained in Russia by request from the Uzbek side and was accused of spreading the ideas of religious extremism, and was nearly extradited. However, after interference by the Strasburg court the extradition was canceled.   

“While there was investigation, the head of UFSB for Tulskaya oblast, Major General Lebedev, sent a letter to the federal migration service with an instruction of refusing Kurbanov the refugee status” tells Elena Ryabinina, the employee of the Committee “Grazhdanskoe sodeistvie” (fittingly, Civil Assistance). The letter contained reference to documents sent from Uzbekistan alleging that Mr. Kurbanov was guilty of various crimes up to “using the Islamic religion for breaking the civil agreement”. Although no evidence was submitted in the letter mentioned, the Migration Service refused the refugee status to Kurbanov, who has been trying to appeal that decision, unsuccessfully yet.  

Files on suspects, immunity for employees  

To make the new system work properly, RCTS began to form the common data bank on the wanted terrorists, separatists and extremists.

It shall be noted that the Russian Criminal Code does not contain the term “separatism”. This “trifle” did not confuse the State Duma and Federation Council that ratified the SOC agreements and conventions.    

To secure the new system’s work on detaining the suspect on the territories of the six states, it was necessary to give guarantees to executing officers. They had to be protected against arrest in a foreign country in case of failure.    

SOC managed to provide absolute protection to its representatives. The Convention on Privileges and Immunities of SOC, ratified by Russia in 2005, equalized the representatives of the SOC structures to diplomats. They are not subjects to criminal liability for any actions committed by them on their duty, they have immunity from arrest, detention etc. 

Same unlimited opportunities are given to “experts” executing commissions by SOC. They have immunity from arrest for the period of their service trips and their baggage cannot be searched through. Significantly, their immunity is prolonged with them even after their service trip is over.  

The premises of RCTS SOC are also protected against any intrusion. The Convention secures that no representatives of authorities can enter an RCTS place without consent given by its director. The RCTS property also has immunity from any interference, including the means of transportation and all the documents, regardless of location.   

Of course, it’s too early now to say that all those measures were taken only to allow using the RCTS premises as secret prisons, like those by CIA, and that immunity is necessary to protect a foreign service officer acting under an “expert” disguise. Nonetheless, it is not quite clear why representatives of a respected international organization, which purposes are clear and understandable, must be protected from the laws of the country they work in.       

It seems that it is not likely that any secret air companies will be needed for transportation of the detained people. While CIA used the special flights to hide the traces from journalists and from the public, Russian special services do not have similar problems – they just refuse submitting any information, pleading to various circumstances.   

After failing attempt of extradition of Alisher Usmanov (he was accused of belonging to a terrorist organization Khizb Ut Takhrir, but he had managed to get Russian citizenship and became a teacher in madrasah in Kazan (Russia)), he was just kidnapped by unknown persons in 2005. Three months later his relatives found him in a prison in Namangan (Uzbekistan). Human rights activists failed to find out which way Mr. Usmanov was brought to Uzbekistan.    

According to our information, there has been only one instance of secret taking a person with the use of a military plane. This is about Mukhamadruzi Iskandarov, personal enemy of Tajik President Rakhmonov. Mr. Iskandarov was kidnapped in 2005 after the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office had refused his extradition. Afterwards, he passed a letter from the prison, describing the circumstances of the kidnapping done. Being masked and cuffed, he did not hear any announcements characteristic of regular flights at airports. So he concluded he had been carried by a military or military-transport aircraft. Landing in Dushanbe, he crossed the Russian-Tajik border under the name of a certain Gennady Balanin.          

Who profits out of this system?

A question is natural: who of the six RCTS SOC members profits most of all out of the Shanghai initiatives?

Obviously, Russia gets nothing out of it. Above all, there are no terrorists escaping from the North Caucasus to Uzbekistan. According to official reports by FSB, there are almost no detentions made for Russia in Tajikistan, Kirgizia, Kazakhstan and China. It’s been for years that FSB calls Azerbaijan and Georgia to be a shelter for Chechen terrorists; and those countries are no SOC members.  

Uzbekistan and China seem to be basic beneficiaries of the new counter-terrorist system of SOC. 

In 2003 the headquarters of RCTS moved from Bishkek to the Uzbek capital of Tashkent. In 2005 Russia has put the Khizb Ut Takhrir party, which is recognized to be legal in Europe and the US, into the list of terrorist organizations, under the request from Uzbekistan. The Uzbek President sees the threat for his personal power in the activities by this party featured with utopian theories about Islamic Caliphate, and he has been persecuting its members not only in his country, but also in Russia.  

Soon Russia made another gift to Karimov. In a regular RCTS meeting in March 2006 the first FSB director informed that Russia had given 19 people, suspected of membership in Khizb Ut Takhrir, to Uzbekistan. 

In 2008 the Uzbek President’s enemies were announced to be a threat to Russian national security. In spring that-time FSB director Patrushev stated that “international terrorist organizations Khizb Ut Tahrir and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)” are basic threats for Russia.    

Differently from Khizb Ut Takhrir, the IMU is a real fighting organization. However, in recent years the movement has been declining, and its remaining not numerous forces continue resistance somewhere at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is no intelligence proving that IMU activities affect Russia. The movement’s leader Takhir Yuldashev has threatened recently with death to Presidents of some countries for persecution of Muslims. But that was about leaders of Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and Tajikistan, not Russia.        

China is another state getting advantage out of the new system, as the Uigur separatists often escape to the Central Asian countries and the simplified procedure of their giving up plays the game of the Chinese special services.    

Even today’s talk about expansion of SOC through inclusion of Iran and Pakistan are more advantageous for Uzbeks and Chinese, as people split off IMU are residing in Iran and there are camps of Uigur separatists in Pakistan.   

SOC is a young and growing organization. In 2005 it was added with Iran and Pakistan in their capacity of observers. The writer Salman Rushdie, cursed by ayatollah Khomeini, is still considered to be a culprit in Iran, and is sentenced to death for his novel “The Satanic verse”. In case Iran becomes a SOC member, Salman Rushdie will get to the common data bank. Then it would be better for him not to appear in Russia, where he might be caught by the officers of the Corps of the Islamic Revolution Guards arriving in the country with SOC “experts” documents.    

Comment by jurist

We have asked Karinna Moskalenko, the head of the Center for Assistance to international defense, to assess the situation. The Center offers legal support to Russian citizens applying to the European Court for Human Rights:  

“Russia needs to think about her international reputation before entering such alliances with countries where human rights are not observed, according to the EU opinion. The states from SOC do not guarantee the accused a protection against tortures and do not guarantee the just trial. It is necessary to carry out independent legal expertise of the SOC agreements and conventions so that to see whether they correspond to the norms of the international law, recognized by the Russian Federation, and to the Russian legislation. If all those documents contradict the European convention about human rights, then it is necessary to apply to the European court about the emergency procedure. The term “separatism” requires especially careful consideration, as it is too broad and vague concept to be criminalized; same applies to immunity from the criminal liability given to SOC representatives.”