The protracted story of withdrawal of the Russian Army from the Georgian territory leaves a very significant question behind the scenes. The question is about the actual status of the peace-makers, a placement-to-be of which is being argued so intensively about. 

The Russian President and the foreign minister state that a contingent of no more than 500 solders is going to be deployed on the external border of the security zone, while the rest of the Russian troops, used for reinforcing the peace-makers, would be brought to the South Ossetia. At the same time, it is stated that no Georgian peace-makers would be present on the territory of the conflict.   

In the meantime, the Sochi (Dagomys) agreements dated 24 June, signed by Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze, referred to by the Russian representatives as a ground for “peacemaking mandate”, dealt above all with “demilitarization of the conflict region and elimination of opportunity of involvement in the conflict of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”. It also said about instituting the Mixed Control Commission (MCC) responsible for cease-fire and withdrawal of the armed formations, dismissing the self-defense forces and securing the safe conditions. The MCC was to be composed of the representatives of the involved sides (Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia).     

Under the MCC it was formed the Mixed Peace-Keeping Forces (MPKF) consisting of Georgian, Russian and Ossetian militaries with a number of 500 people from each side. On 6 December 1994 the MCC approved of the “Regulations on basic principles of activities by military contingents and observers intended for normalization of the situation in the zone of Georgia-Ossetia conflict”. In accordance with those decisions, the MPKF was submitted to United Commandment composed of Russian, Georgian and Ossetian representatives (with the chief commander appointed by the Russian side). The document also said that “in case of violation the conditions of the cease-fire the decision of using the force by the peace-keeping contingents and of using the observers is taken by the MPKF Commander with the purpose of restoring the peace with notification made to the MCC”. Along with that, “the pursuit and conduct of military operations against criminal elements outside the conflict zone must be done with obligatory notification of the local authorities and law enforcement bodies”.     

There is no need to explain that by this moment the actions by both sides have violated repeatedly the Dagomys Agreements and the above mentioned decisions by the MCC.  Neither Russian nor Georgian commandment have notified the MCC about beginning of military operations and both sides have applied artillery, tanks and aviation, which was prohibited with mutual agreements. And of course, it would be ridiculous talking that Russian militaries “notified” the Georgian authorities about going beyond the zone of conflict. Besides, the refusal by the Russian side and by South Ossetian authorities to allow Georgian peace-makers into the staff of MPKF makes the Sochi Agreements void whatever Russia stated about that today.     

This is the first and not the last juridical circumstance proving that today’s “peacemaking mandate” by the Russian Army in Georgia is nothing but a myth.   

Another circumstance is that to reinforce the Russian peacemaking contingent in the South Ossetia with the purpose of what was called “coercion to peace” in the Kremlin, it was necessary to comply with the norms of the Federal Act #93 “On order of providing by the Russian Federation the military and civilian staff for participation in the peace-keeping activities”.   

According to that Act, a decision of sending the Russian military units outside the territory of the Russian Federation is taken by the President on the basis of corresponding regulation by the Federation Council. As for “coercion to peace”, according to the Act above, such actions may only be carried out by decision of the UN Security Council taken in correspondence with the UN Chart with the purpose of elimination of threat to peace or of suppressing the acts of aggression.    

There have been precedents of using this Act in the Russian political practice. 25 June 1999 the Federation Council gave its consent to using the Russian armed units with a number of 3,616 people for international presence in Kosovo, up to 10 June 2000. As for “Georgian case”, the Act above was just forgotten completely as well as Article 102 of the Russian Constitution.  

Of course, there is no doubt that the current Federation Council would vote for any President’s suggestion about the use of the Russian Army; however, it was even convened. Everyone just kept silence – the Federation Council members, State Duma deputies, and the Prosecutor General’s Office that is to watch the legality. And the matter was about a serious thing – sending the Russian soldiers and officers to war.