Novaya Gazeta continues building up a generalized portrait of the Russian citizen jointly with the leading specialists from the poll researching Levada-Center: Director of the Center Lev Gudkov, chief of the social and political research division Boris Dubin, and chief of social cultural research Alexei Levinson. The first séance of reconstruction of the Russian average citizen image was held in the issue #23 for 2008 (“Adaptation to the repressive state”).      

No rushing is needed

Boris Dubin: I would formulate the question this way: what is more desired by people – guarantees or changes? Should we leave everything as it is just not to make it worse, or must there be any changes? If we take a look at the figures than the today’s proportion will be as follows: 30-35% of the respondents say we need drastic changes, while 60-65% consider that no rushing is needed and we must be very careful. What’s behind all that?   

It means, first, that we live in the country of “cared for” people, i.e. those who are used to be cared about by the state. Second, the major part of those having lived through the 90’s have a negative experience of the past reforms. Their own feelings are confirmed by their peers and by the media that paint the 90’s so black, after which the 2000’s seem to be an idyll. On our television and in a mass consciousness the 2000’s are the years where “stability returned to us”. And “stability” for over 50% of the interrogated people means above all the opportunity to live on pension or salary.     

If we talk of people who managed to take the new opportunities and gained something out of it, the share of those people has increased a bit in recent years. In the 90’s and early 2000’s the figure was 7-8% and now it is 11-12%. That means there is some stable number of people who managed to take the circumstances to their own advantage. However, those people don’t want any sharp changes either. They speak for stability and political order; their only wish is that the regime not bothers them too much.        

So, on the whole the idea of changes is not much popular in Russia.  The top circles do not support it, arguing that they embody stability, order and even democracy. The population accepts this evaluation in general, including the aspect of democracy. In particular, 40% of the interrogated say to a question “what’s going on in the country in political sense?” -  “democracy is being built up”.   

All the experience is behind

Lev Gudkov: I’d like to return to the period where the idea of reforms originated, that’s the Perestroika times. In the mid-80’s the society was not ready for changes despite the general feeling of stagnation and getting into quagmire. There were no special plans for reforms, no practical developments or even general guidelines. Along with that, the educated part of the population had developed a feeling that our country had fallen behind the world history. That was a feature in 1988-1989, the time when we started to carry out our research.      

What were people waiting for? They waited for the same, but in a better form. They would like more humane, tolerable and minding authority, that wouldn’t oppress intelligentsia so much. They wanted that the leadership take care about raising the living standards. People wanted justice; they wanted that high-ranking functionaries not have too much privilege. In other words, people’s attitudes fit the image of “socialism with humane face”. All that was pure paternalist orientation. So everyone waited for changes but neither intelligentsia, nor authority, nor did masses know what kind of changes it should be. Those who were ready a bit better – some part of economists – tried to improvise the changes in their hope that the market, being turned on, would adjust everything automatically. This is why what happened later turned out to be an unexpected thing, a shock, and the hope for wonder failed with the expectation that a mere release from soviet power would be a salvation and the West “will help us”. Then an active conservative reaction appeared to those changes: irritation, tiredness of reforms, growth of nostalgia for the past, idealization of the previous Brezhnev’s stagnation as the gold times of stability, moderate well-being and predictability. And the annoyance grew up with reformers and democrats.

This had become especially clear by the mid-90’s. It’s then that growth of xenophobia, nationalism and irritation with the West and democracy began and the need for order and stability appeared. Domestic political shocks of 1993-1994 contributed to that too, together with the Chechen War accompanied with casualties, terrorism and so forth. The feeling of lack of stability got even stronger after the default of 1998 that affected people very much. Not only people’s material well-being was damaged but also that mental one. The future itself of the country got to be disputed. At that background a strong need in a leader appeared, a man that could take the country out of crisis, reduce the reforms, give the order, get engaged in struggle with the crime and – above all – begin the raising of the standards of living.      

By the time Putin came to power, several factors had coincided: growth of the home industry, very good oil conjuncture, social need for order, and the transfer of all those conservative expectations to the new authority. In the mass consciousness, the new authority became to be the source of benevolence, stability and growth of income. Whatever we said about that, one must admit that the number of absolutely poor people, who had not means to satisfy their basic needs, has diminished three times as less during the period of 2000-2007.       

And the most important thing that happened was getting some calm, some feeling that shocks and catastrophes of the 90’s would never return. Hence, the current attitude towards the reforms: yes, we need some changes but they must be smoothened and be done gradually without any drastic measures taken. We don’t need any rushing or risk.     

The degree of discontent with the standing authority is still rather high (more than half of those interrogated). However, Yuri Levada called it “loyal discontent”. It is getting less intensive. People are getting used to reality and begin to think that great changes have happened in the country. They realize that the expected wonder has not come, but still the current situation is the one that can be tolerated.   

Boris Dubin: The general idea is that if everything remains like it is now and not gets worse, then it is quite acceptable. Now the level of willingness to take part in mass disturbances is the lowest during all the history of our measurements. The number of those who are ready personally for any protest actions is especially small. And if we take a look at the dynamics of the people’s feeling, we shall see it is getting better. Along with that, people are getting used to an idea of having a unified ruler who could have the full power and no responsibility. In 1989 only 20% of people considered that it was better to give all the power to one man to provide the order, and 40% of people believed it must be done by no means. Now the pattern is just the opposite: 45-50% consider it to be a bless, the concentration of power with one person, and those who are against this, they are in 20%.      

No reform designs, no reformers

Alexei Levinson: There was a program of reforms of the “Perestroika” club. There also was dissipated program in the society which could be called to be “Sakharov’s”. Today one may see nothing like that. There are no names of potential reformers or no prospects seen where Russia might arrive as a result of possible reforms done. No one offers any reform design, and the state does not either. The existing state projects for reforms are reduced to promises to restore the greatness of Russia or to plans of increasing the gross domestic product. Anyway, all that is not what was meant when it was talked about reforms before. Today “to reform” means to improve something a little. So the discontent with previous reforms may be remaining due to momentum, but there is no object for this feeling. I shall repeat that today we have no reformers in any sphere.  

Another thing is that the West in the 80’s was a kind of design, a model for us. We had a notion that our soviet past was a dead end and we had to get back to the main track. There was an idea that we should strive to live like Europe did. Now no one has such an idea. On the one hand, the West has become closer to us. We have a lot of information and many our people visit it and even work and live there. Spending a lot of money you can provide for yourself the life similar to that in the West in terms of everyday conveniences and comforts. All those solutions relate to everyday life, they are not of political or ideological nature. And the idea is not expressed now in the public that Russia should follow the western way.   

Lev Gudkov: The majority have agreed that Russia has a “special way”. No one knows what it is exactly, and that does not matter. What matters is stressing that we live by ourselves and no one else’s standards are applicable to us.    

Boris Dubin: There used to be another important component of the reforms design, especially at the early Yeltsin. It was an idea of returning to the state of the pre-revolutionary Russia and to delete the soviet period from our history. Now this idea has gone, and the positive attitude is restored to our soviet past. Along with that the idea of pre-revolutionary Russia is not given up. One may rather say the two Russia’s got connected to each other. Unlike the Yeltsin’s ideologists, who looked on the USSR as a deviation, the current ideologists say about the direct line of continuity within one historical whole.      

Alexei Levinson: Putin’s epoch belongs to this whole too. And we are hanging around this whole space. 

Boris Dubin: Take a note that the “troubled” 90’s have been removed completely from this present-past and there is a black spot at that place. 

Unstable stability

Lev Gudkov: The fact is obvious of failure of all big and fundamental reforms. 11 attempts of reforming the army failed, and we did not turn it into professional one. Failed also an attempt of making the independent court that could defend effectively people’s interests and not those of the authority. Accordingly, we do not have any forms of protection of private property from administrative apparatus, which would help the maintenance of real stability. However, according to our recent research of the middle class (those families having income of $2,000 per month per head) it seems that the epoch of stability has come. But what kind of stability it is, when 60% of those who speak about stability say that it won’t last long? This paradox reflects the feeling of the lack of institutional support for the changes occurred. For only effective and working institutions – court, judicial system on the whole, separation of powers and mutual control, open and effective press, real parliament and others – may provide for confidence in one’s future. With the lack of all the above mentioned, there is a feeling of uncertainty and unclear prospects.        

Alexei Levinson: Significantly, the small and medium-sized business has shown a kind of nostalgia for “past” Putin’s period unlike his recent period before ending of his terms. The focus-groups, made shortly before the elections, have proved that the business felt some instability and things went worse for it. For example, Medvedev said he would get engaged in the problems of small business. It looks nice, but it turns out that those statements made the business nervous, because Medvedev sent a message to those who gain their profits out of imposing pressure on small business. The message was that they would be taken away that source of revenue and they began hastily to try to take everything they could, while the going is good. Thus, expectations of changes for the good turned into growing kickbacks, unstableness and violation of the rules of game. It’s been for long that the Russian business has developed its own way of dealing with the authority as if saying ‘there is no need in laws, we shall pay for everything and arrange everything by ourselves’. When the fixed rates are known and people who must be paid are known too, then the expenses are included into self-cost and so business can live without problems. But when officials come to you twice, that seems to be dangerous. So the ideal state of the small business is when it is just left in peace.          

Bois Dubin: We are dealing with a pronounced adaptive society. Different social groups are oriented for adaptation instead of changes. We asked questions to members of so called middle class (how can it be “middle”, counting only a few percent of the whole population!). 60% of them accept the current illegal situation, because they know how to behave in it. They prefer arrangements made out-of-court. They prefer paying for the norm and not for the higher quality!  

Lev Gudkov: Everyone realizes that today the power belongs to law enforcers and related with them big business. So it’s useless trying to oppose under existing political situation where the authority controls the police, special services, courts, prosecutor’s office and tax agencies. Businessmen prefer to adapt and to reduce the pressure and the risks. They prefer buying the services from the state. This is why people have no real picture of their future life. Those who are wealthier, they have in mind an opportunity of fleeing to abroad in case of worsened situation. They consider this opportunity mainly because of their children, as business is impossible to be brought out.    

Demand for freedom

Alexei Levinson: It’s always important to see a transition of words and values from one social group to another. This also applies to a category of freedom. Significantly, today we hear about freedom exactly from the Kremlin and not somewhere else. This means, the notion of freedom has changed. We asked a question to people on the eve of the elections “Do you feel that you are a free person?” The result was amazing: over half of people answered “yes” and most part of them said they were going to vote for United Russia. Such are our today’s champions for freedom! This figure leaves little space for irony and it reminds of the recent formula “we are building a democratic society headed by President Putin”. Putin used to be perceived as the main democrat, as he picked up the baton from Yeltsin. Later, however, the meaning of the word “democracy” changed. We have asked a question recently: “What’s more important for you – human rights or good order in the state, freedom of speech and freedom of traveling abroad or normal wages and sizable pension benefit?” It turned out that the order is preferred to human rights, while freedom of traveling and freedom of speech are preferred to good wages and pensions. Analysis shows that there is a minor category within society (about 12%) who goes for “bread and order” and does not need freedom and human rights. About 30% make undoubted choice for the rights and freedoms. Those are a kind of “freedom romantics” for whom material well-being is nothing. And the most interesting part are those for whom in one case freedom is more important and in other case the well-being is preferable. This is a concept of freedom as a “relativised” value about which it is possible to bargain. When freedom is no absolute value any more, it may be distributed, gifted and even sold like other exchange values. Then the regime may grant it to those who deserve it.                  

Boris Dubin: We are returning to the point where we proceeded from – what matters more: opportunities or guarantees, reforms or status quo. As we can see, the dominating part of population – up to 60% - has nothing against freedom. And yet freedom is not the main value for them. Order, stability, regular and rising wages and pensions, also a feeling of being protected matter more for them. The know-how of the developed societies – joining the ideas of independence, solidarity, freedom and competition – has not found acceptance with us. We have all that separated, with the main wish by people that everything remains as it is.      

Lev Gudkov: The main wish by our citizens is “don’t disturb us”. Leave us in peace, don’t bother us and don’t oppress too much. We are willing to endure you all, but you must not trespass. The main intension by the masses is that they want to be given certain conditions of more or less comfortable life. For that they are ready to give anything. 

Boris Dubin: About 57% of people consider there is enough freedom in the country. 24% think there is too much freedom. And only 12% say there is too little freedom.  

Lev Gudkov: That 12% are those who are informed well of what democracy should be like. Those are more educated people, with cultural capital, oriented to enlarging their outlook and opportunities. Those are also intensively working people, who do not need the guarantees by the state. They have minimal paternalist attitude. However, for the most part of the population “freedom” is not an urgent issue; it’s not what they want to reflect about.