Novaya Gazeta continues publishing materials dedicated to the role and prospects of the Russian opposition. In the issues 19 and 23 this year we presented opinions by the observer Pavel Voshanov and the leader of the United Civil Front Garry Kasparov. Below you will find the view by Vladimir Ryzhkov. 

It has formed an astonishing situation about opposition in our country. In Iran the opposition raises millions signatures for the rights of women and manages to get to the parliament despite the removal of the main candidates from the election process. In Pakistan it ousts generals from the power. In Venezuela it wrecks the referendum about enlarging the presidential powers. Even in Byelorussia oppositionists disturb Lukashenko. As for Russia, there’s a hush like that in a cemetery. Opposition is swept away from the parliament. It’s influence on decision-making process is equal to nothing. It is not even able to bring ten thousand supporters to the street meetings.   

All that requires to be pondered on. The answer to the question of the prospects by Russian opposition is to define whether the country has a chance of getting out of a “resourceful state capitalism” swampy track.

Now we can conclude about failure of all the strategies tried by the opposition in the period of 1990’s -2000’s. For example, the strategy of active collaboration with the authority and even full-scale taking part in the governing the country (like it was in case of DPR-SPS), under conditions where all the successes were trumpeted about as successes by the party in power, led to the situation where the electors of the liberal-loyalists got confused why they should vote for them and not for United Russia.  

“Maneuvering strategy” was another failure. It used fluctuating from one’s attitude as opposition with principles to half-loyal attitude, and back. That way, Yabloko, that was a strict opposition to the regime and policy of Boris Yeltsin, got closer in paradoxical way to Vladimir Putin in 2000, despite his openly carried out anti-democratic policy. Taking part in authority (Lukin, Artemyev), combined with criticizing the authority and combined with the tactic of “small feats” like struggling against “pointed housing construction” in Moscow, and combined with the voting for Moscow mayor Luzhkov in the Moscow Duma, discredited the party gradually and made confused even its faithful supporters. 

The Communists have not been successful either. They fought the regime up to impeachment attempt to Yeltsin in 1999, and at the same time they got built into the power through taking part in the Primakov’s government and through supporting many Kremlin’s foreign policy initiatives. Today the party is busy with keeping its status quo. It has no political influence in the country and in the Duma. Forming factions in the Duma and in the regional parliaments seems to be its cherry on the cake.  

No results have been achieved out of the strategy of tough opposing the system from outside. The attempts of consolidating the oppositional forces within the frames of Committee 2008, All-Russian Civil Congress and Other Russia did not result in making the “united front for democracy”. The Marches of the Discordant collect no more people than those by Communists (who are still treated tolerantly by authorities). It’s difficult to say now whether the National Assembly – that’s the alternative parliament that is to be held in May 2008 – will be able to get a new quality of opposition.  

So, the three main oppositional strategies – the loyal, tough and maneuvering ones – turned out to be a failure. Who gained out of all that? The board was swept by the coalition of parties in power (United Russian and Just Russia) and LDPR playing up to them. So they formed the Duma of the fifth convocation (not numerous Communists may be just discarded there). The opposition has found itself to be ousted to the street in all senses of the word.   

There are two popular explanations for disappearance of the opposition from the political arena. Some say it’s because the oppositionists have shown poor performance and this is why people abandoned them. Others say it’s the entire nation that is bad, as it went for the cheap vodka and some bones thrown like Olympiad in Sochi. 

Partly, both explanations are true. None of the parties are featured with any mechanisms of changes of generations or assuming responsibility for defeat by the leaders, with the exception of SPS. The parties get “worn” with time and the interest to them disappears. As for common people, they are easily influenced by the propaganda and hate alternately Estonia, Ukraine and Georgia, and hate Berezovsky constantly. 

But the explanations above are not comprehensive. In the 90’s the opposition did not have much success either and the citizens were also an easy prey to propaganda and cheap populism (it’s enough to remember the triumph of Zhirinovsky in 1993). Nevertheless, there was struggle of ideas, and there was freedom of speech and real federalism. Democracy really worked, though with faults. People were able to elect parliament, governors and mayors. Opposition could influence the policy, up to forming the coalition government in 1998. So with same leaders present and with same people living in the country the opposition still had its own place in the politics. That means, there must be other reasons for today’s state of things.  

To my mind, the changed attitude by the ruling elites is the main reason. Limitless self-seeking being the chief characteristic of the Russian ruling class, the state budget and the former soviet property are the source of satisfying. In the 90’s the elite used the ideology of “liberal democracy” and privatization to appropriate the budget means and state property. Then the state broke down to many hubs and each of them had its own power resource, defending their properties. That was the time of clans. The country of former Gulag turned into the country of financial-industrial groups.    

In 2000 Putin changed abruptly the rules of the game. Not availability of one’s own “piece” of authority and property, but being built-in into the vertical of power, topped with St Petersburg’s special services clan, became the guarantee for the capital seized in the 90’s. Those who did not understand that or did not submit, they either were put to prison or had to leave the country. The rest just built themselves in. This is how United Russia appeared. The many-thousand Russian bureaucratic camp of high ranking officials joined – without willing it too much – the party ranks, while the fattest pieces of the national pie came under control of those who found themselves on the top. As for opposition, it was thrown on the sand with a single stroke of the “bear’s” paw, where it is choking now being deprived of any means for survival.    

So the reason for the death of Russian opposition and elimination of guaranteed by the Constitution political competition is not faults and mistakes by real parties and politicians, and not exaggerated inertness of the Russian people. The reason is the crucial change of the games of the rule. When elite decides it is advantageous for it to have a monopoly for power, no space is left for the opposition. And the common people, who are used to think that nothing depends on them, they just accepted the new rules and did not even notice the fact they were taken away the right of electing governors and single-mandate deputies.  

So what the opposition is supposed to do? Flinging up the white flag and observing unbelievable growth of corruption and the number of bureaucrats, and rapid monopolization of the economy, and degradation of the human resource, and country’s falling behind? Such a position is impossible either morally or practically. 

I believe, first, that the opposition - and the democratic one above all - should concentrate on the collective forming of the positive “future image” of the country. It must be based on openness and political pluralism; supremacy of law; priority of developing the human capital instead of developing bureaucracy and enforcement bodies; modern economy; protection of rights, including the right for property. It is necessary to explain constantly that today’s model not only leads Russia to cul-de-sac, but it is capable of causing the country’s collapse.  

Second, having formulated the positive program we will have to look for active supporters. Significantly, United Russia and Dmitry Medvedev got their worse results in big cities where the most active and educated part of the society lives. So it’s there that it is necessary to start working first of all.    

Third, there are advocates of the “democracy without adjectives” in the elites too, and their number is bigger than it might appear. The prospect of living under the heel of the “raider’s vertical”, able of destroying anyone at any moment, is not everyone’s dish. So those people must be worked with too, of course, without compromises done to one’s conscience.     

Fourth, it’s necessary to look for the adequate form of political organization that would provide for successful struggle and wouldn’t exclude anyone from common working. It’s not only demand that determines supply; in politics it often happens that a good supply is able of forming the mass demand.